Addictive drugs have been hypothesized to access the same neurophysiological mechanisms as natural learning systems. These natural learning systems can be modeled through temporaldifference reinforcement learning (TDRL), which requires a reward-error signal that has been hypothesized to be carried by dopamine. TDRL learns to predict reward by driving that rewarderror signal to 0. By adding a non-accommodatable drug-induced dopamine increase to a TDRL model, a computational model of addiction is constructed which overselects actions leading to drug-receipt. The model provides an explanation for important aspects of the addiction literature and provides a theoretic viewpoint with which to address other aspects.
If addiction accesses the same neurophysiological mechanisms used by normal reinforcementlearning systems (1-3), then it should be possible to construct a computational model based on current reinforcement-learning theories (4-7) that inappropriately selects an "addictive" stimulus. In this paper, I present a computational model of the behavioral consequences of one effect of drugs of abuse, that of increasing phasic dopamine levels through neuropharmacological means. Many drugs of abuse increase dopamine levels either directly (e.g. cocaine (8) ) or indirectly (e.g. nicotine (9, 10) and heroin (11) ). A neuropharmacologically-driven increase in dopamine is not the sole effect of these drugs, nor is it likely to be the sole reason that drugs of abuse are addictive. However, this model provides an immediate explanation for several important aspects of the addiction literature, including the sensitivity of the probability of selection of drug-receipt to prior drug-experience, to the size of the contrasting non-drug reward, and the sensitivity but inelasticity of drugs of abuse to cost.
The proposed model is based on temporal-difference reinforcement models in which actions are selected so as to maximize future reward (6, 7) . This is done through the calculation of a value function V´s´tµµ, dependent on the state of the world s´tµ. The value function is defined as the expected future reward, discounted by the expected time to reward:
the world (i.e. external to the agent). For example, a model of delay conditioning may include an inter-stimulus-interval state (indicated to the agent by the observation of an ongoing tone); after a set dwell-time within that state, the world transitions to a reward-state and delivers a reward to the agent.
This is an example of changing state due to processes external to the agent. In contrast, in an model of FR1 conditioning, an agent may be in an action-available state (indicated by the observation of a lever available to the agent) and the world will remain in the action-available state until the agent takes the action (of pushing the lever) which will move the world into a reward-state. For simplicity later, an available action will be written as S k a i S l which indicates that the agent can achieve state S l if it is in state S k and selects action a i . Although the model in this paper is phrased in terms of the agent taking "action" a i , addicts have very flexible methods of finding drugs. It is not necessary for the model "actions" to be simple motor actions. S k a i S l indicates the availability of achieving state S l from state S k . The agent selects actions proportional to the expected "benefit" that would be accrued from taking the action; the expected benefit can be determined from the expected change in value and reward (4, 6, 14, 15) .
The goal of TDRL is to correctly learn the value of each state. This can be learned by calculating the difference between expected and observed changes in value (6) . This signal, termed δ , can be used to learn sequences which maximize the amount of reward received over time (6) . δ is not equivalent to pleasure, instead, it is an internal signal indicative of the discrepancy between expectations and observations (5, 7, 15) . Essentially, if the change in value or the achieved reward was better than expected (δ 0), then one should increase the value of the state that led to it. If it was no different from expected (δ 0), than the situation is well-learned and nothing needs to be changed. Because δ transfers backwards from reward states to anticipatory states with learning, actions can be chained together to learn sequences (6) . This is the heart of the temporal-difference reinforcement-learning (TDRL) algorithm (4-7).
TDRL learns the value function by calculating two equations as the agent takes each action. If the agent leaves state S k and enters state S l at time t, at which time it receives reward R´S l µ, then
where γ d indicates raising the discounting factor γ by the delay d spent by the animal in state S k (14) .
V´S k µ is then updated as
where η V is a learning rate parameter.
Phasic increases in dopamine are seen after unexpected natural rewards (16) , however, with learning, these phasic increases shift from the time of reward delivery to cueing stimuli (16) . Transient increases in dopamine are now thought to signal changes in the expected future reward (i.e. unexpected changes in value) (4, 16) . This can occur either with unexpected reward or with unexpected cue stimuli known to signal reward (16) , and have been hypothesized to signal δ (4, 7, 16) . Models of dopamine signalling as δ have been found to be compatible with many aspects of the data (4, 5, 16, 17) .
The results simulated below follow from the incorporation of neuropharmacologically produced dopamine into temporal difference models. The figures below were generated from a simulation using a TDRL instantiation that allows for action selection within a semi-Markov state space, enabling simulations of delay-related experiments (14) . The model also produces hyperbolic discounting under normal conditions, consistent with experimental data (12, 13) by a summation of multiple exponential discounting components (14) , a hypothesis supported by recent fMRI data (18) .
The effect of neuropharmacological release of dopamine on TDRL. The key to TDRL is that once the value function correctly predicts the reward, learning stops. The value function can be said to "accommodate" the reward: the change in value in taking action S k a i S l counterbalances the reward achieved on entering state S l . When this happens, δ 0. Taking transient dopamine as the δ signal (4, 5, 7) , correctly predicted rewards produce no dopamine signal (16, 17) .
However, cocaine and other addictive drugs produce a transient increase in dopamine through
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Computational processes of addiction neuropharmacological mechanisms (1, 2, 8) . The concept of a neuropharmacologically-produced dopamine surge can be modeled by assuming that these drugs induce a "non-accommodatable" increase in δ (19) . In other words, the effect of addictive drugs is to produce a positive δ , independent of the change in value function, making it impossible for the agent to learn a value function which will cancel out the drug-induced increase in δ . Eq. 2 is thus replaced with
where D´S l µ indicates a dopamine surge occurring on entry into state S l . Eq. 4 reduces to normal TDRL (Eq. 2) when D´S l µ 0, but asymptotes to a minimum δ of D´S l µ when D´S l µ 0. This always produces a positive reward-error signal. Thus the values of states leading to a dopamine surge D 0 will approach infinity.
When given a choice between two actions S 0 a 1 S 1 and S 0 a 2 S 2 , the agent chooses actions proportional to the values of the subsequent states, S 1 and S 2 . The more valuable the state taking an action leads to, the more likely the agent is to take that action. In TDRL, the values of states leading to natural rewards asymptote at a finite value (the discounted, total expected future reward); however, in the modified model, the values of states leading to drug-receipt increase without bound. Thus the more the agent traverses the action sequence leading to drug-receipt, the larger the value of the states leading to that sequence, and the more likely the agent is to select an action leading to those states.
Simulations. In this model, drug-receipt produces a δ 0 signal, which produces an increase in the value of states leading to the drug-receipt. Thus, the value of states leading to drug-receipt increase without bound. In contrast, the values of states leading to natural reward asymptote to a value approximating Eq. 1. This implies that the selection probability between actions leading to natural rewards will reach an asymptotic balance. However, the selection probability of actions leading to drug-receipt will depend on the number of experiences. Simulations bear this out (Fig. 1 ).
In the simulations, drug-receipt entails a normal-sized, accomodatable reward R´sµ and a small,
non-accomodatable dopamine signal D´sµ (14) . Early use of drugs occurs because they are highly rewarding (1, 3, 20) , but this use transitions to a compulsive use with time (1, 3, 20, 21, 32) . In the model, the R´sµ term provides for the early rewarding component, while the gradual effect of the D´sµ term provides for the eventual transition to addiction. This model thus shows that a transition to addiction can occur without any explicit sensitization or tolerance to dopamine, at least in principle.
The unbounded increase in value of states leading to drug-reward does not mean that with enough experience, drugs of abuse are always selected over non-drug rewards. Instead, it predicts that the likelihood of selecting the drug over a non-drug reward will be dependent on the size of the contrasting non-drug reward relative to the current value of the states leading to drug-receipt ( Fig. 1 ).
When animals are given a choice between food and cocaine, the probability of selecting cocaine depends on the amount of food available as an alternative and the cost of each choice (22, 23) . Similarly, humans given a choice between cocaine and money will decrease their cocaine selections with increased value of the alternative (24) . This may explain the success of vouchers in treatment (24) .
This will continue to be true even in well-experienced (highly-addicted) subjects, but the sensitivity to the alternate should decrease with experience (see below). This may explain the incompleteness of the success of vouchers (24) .
Natural rewards are sensitive to cost in that animals (including humans) will work harder for more valuable rewards. This level of sensitivity is termed elasticity in economics. Addictive drugs are also sensitive to cost in that increased prices decrease usage (25, 26) . However, while the use of addictive drugs does show sensitivity to cost, that sensitivity is significantly inelastic relative to similar measures applied to natural rewards (25, 27) . The TDRL model proposed here produces just such an effect: Both modeled drugs and natural rewards are sensitive to cost, but drug reward is less elastic than the natural rewards ( Fig. 2 ).
In TDRL, the value of states leading to natural rewards asymptote to a stable value which depends on the time to the reward, the reward level, and the discounting factors. However, in the modified TDRL model, the value of states leading to drug rewards increase without bound, producing a ratio
of a constant cost to increasing value. This decreasing ratio predicts that the elasticity of drugs to cost should decrease with experience, while it should not for natural rewards (Fig. S4 ).
Predictions
Developing inelasticity. The hypothesis that values of states leading to drug-receipt increase without bound implies that the elasticity to cost should decrease with use, while the elasticity of natural rewards should not. This also suggests that increasing the reward for not choosing the drug (such as vouchers (24)) will be more effective early in the transition from casual drug-use to addiction.
Blocking. The hypothesis that cocaine produces a δ 0 dopamine signal on drug-receipt implies that cocaine should not show blocking. Blocking is an animal-learning phenomenon in which pairing a reinforcer with a conditioning stimulus does not show association if the reinforcer is already predicted by another stimulus (17, 28, 29) . For example, if a reinforcer X is paired with cue A, animals will learn to respond to cue A. If X is subsequently paired with simultaneously-presented cues A and B, animals will not learn to associate X with B. This is thought to occur because X is completely predicted by A, and there is no error signal (δ 0) to drive the learning (17, 28, 29) . If cocaine is used as the reinforcer instead of natural rewards, the dopamine signal should always be present (δ 0), even for the AB stimulus. Thus, cocaine (and other drugs of abuse) should not show blocking.
Dual dopamine signals in experienced users. The hypothesis that the release of dopamine by cocaine accesses TDRL systems implies that experienced animals will show a double dopamine signal in cued-response tasks (14) . As with natural rewards, a transient dopamine signal should appear to a cueing signal that has been associated with reward (16). However, whereas natural rewards only produce dopamine release if unexpected (16, 17) , cocaine produces dopamine release directly (8) . Thus, after learning, both the cue and the cocaine should produce dopamine (Fig. 3 ). Supporting this hypothesis, Phillips et al. (30) found using fast-scan cyclic voltammetry that in rats trained to associate an audiovisual signal with cocaine, both the audiovisual stimulus and the cocaine itself produced dramatic increases in the extracellular concentration of dopamine in the nucleus accumbens.
Discussion. Substance abuse is a complex disorder. TDRL explains some phenomena that arise in addiction, and makes testable predictions about other phenomena. The test of a theory such as this one is not whether it encompasses all phenomena associated with addiction, but whether the predictions that follow from it are confirmed.
This model has been built on assumptions about cocaine, but cocaine is far from the only substance that humans (and other animals) abuse. Many drugs of abuse indirectly produce dopamine signals, including nicotine (10) and heroin and other opiates (11) . Although these drugs have other effects as well (1), the effects on dopamine should produce the consequences described above, leading to inelasticity and compulsion.
Historically, an important theoretical explanation of addictive behavior has been that of "rational addiction" (31) , in which the user is assumed to maximize value or "utility" over time, but because long-term rewards for quitting are discounted more than short-term penalties, the maximized function entails remaining addicted. The TDRL theory proposed in this paper differs from that of rational addiction in that TDRL proposes that addiction is inherently "irrational" -it uses the same mechanisms as natural rewards, but the system behaves in a non-optimal way due to neuropharmacological effects on dopamine. Because the D´sµ component cannot be accomodated, it eventually overwhelms the R´sµ reward terms (from both drug and contrasting natural rewards). Eventually, the agent behaves irrationally and rejects the larger rewards in favor of the (less-rewarding) addictive stimulus. The TDRL and rational-addiction theories make testably different predictions: While rational-addiction predicts that drugs-of-abuse will show similar elasticity to cost as natural rewards do, the TDRL theory predicts that drugs-of-abuse will show increasing inelasticity with use.
The rational addiction theory (31) assumes exponential discounting of future rewards, while humans and other animals consistently show hyperbolic discounting of future rewards (12, 13) . Ainslie (13) has suggested that the "cross-over" effect that occurs with hyperbolic discounting explains many aspects of addiction. The TDRL model used here also shows hyperbolic discounting (14) , and so accesses the results noted by Ainslie (13) . However, in the theory proposed here, hyperbolic discount-
ing is not the fundamental reason for the agent getting trapped in a non-optimal state. Rather, the TDRL theory hypothesizes that it is the neuropharmacological effect of certain drugs on dopamine signals that drives the agent into the non-optimal state.
Robinson and Berridge (32) have suggested that dopamine mediates the desire to achieve a goal ("wanting"), differentiating "wanting" from the hedonic desire of "liking. is more similar to "wanting" than to "liking" in the terminology of Robinson and Berridge (15, 32) .
In TDRL, dopamine does not directly encode "wanting," but because learning an appropriate value function depends on an accurate δ signal, dopamine will be necessary for acquisition of "wanting".
Many unmodeled phenomena play important roles in the compulsive self-administration of drugs of abuse (1), including titration of internal levels of drug (33), sensitization and tolerance (34), withdrawal symptoms and release from them (20) , and compensation mechanisms (35, 38) . Additionally, individuals show extensive inter-personal variability (36, 37) . While these aspects are not addressed in the model presented here, many of these can be modeled by adding parameters to the model: for example, sensitization can be included by allowing the drug-induced-delta parameter D´sµ to vary with experience. Another important issue in reinforcement-learning is what happens when the reward or drug is removed. In normal TDRL, the value of states leading to reward decay back to zero when that reward is not delivered (6) . This follows from the existence of a strongly negative δ signal in the absense of expected reward. Although firing of dopamine neurons is inhibited in the absense of expected reward (16), the inhibition is dramatically less than the corresponding excitation was (7). In general, the simple decay of value seen in TDRL (6, 39) does not model extinction very well, particularly in terms of reinstantiation after extinction (40) . Modeling extinction (even for natural rewards) is likely to require additional components not included in current TDRL models, such as state-space expansion.
Conclusion A theory of addiction that is compatible with a large literature of extant data and that makes explicitly testable predictions has been deduced from two simple hypotheses: (1) dopamine serves as a reward-error learning signal to produce temporal-difference learning in the normal brain, and (2) cocaine produces a phasic increase in dopamine directly (i.e. neuropharmacologically). A computational model was derived by adding a non-accomodatable δ signal to a TDRL model. The theory makes predictions about human behavior (developing inelasticity), animal behavior (resistance to blocking), and neurophysiology (dual dopamine signals in experienced users). Addiction is likely to be a complex process arising from transitions between learning algorithms (3, 20, 32) .
Bringing addiction theory into a computational realm will allow us to make these theories explicit and to directly explore these complex transitions.
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The Agent temporal difference reinforcement learning model
As noted in the paper, the goal of temporal-difference reinforcment learning (TDRL) is to learn to select actions so as to maximize future reward. This is done by learning a value function V´sµ dependent on the state of the world s. See Equation 1 of the main paper.
The qualitative results and predictions in the main paper derive from the explicit hypotheses, specifically that (1) the normal brain uses a temporal-difference reinforcement learning algorithm for normal learning of action selection, (2) dopamine serves as the reward-error signal within this TDRL algorithm, and (3) drugs of abuse produce a phasic increase in dopamine directly (i.e. neuropharmacologically).
The qualitative results and predictions do not critically depend on the specific instantiation of TDRL used. A number of TDRL variants exist, each with subtle differences (S1-S15). Sufficient data are not yet available to enable a decision between these detailed instantiations of TDRL. However, in order to
show simulation results, we must commit to an instantiation. We will commit to the Agents model of Kurth-Nelson and Redish (S13, full paper in preparation). This TDRL instantiation lives within a partially-observable semi-Markov process model, enabling time-dependent experiments, including discounting. In addition, it is the only current model to show true hyperbolic discounting which is an important aspect of the extant data (S16-S18). But, again, I stress that neither the compatibility of the model with extant data, nor the predictions arising from the underlying hypotheses are dependent on the specifics of this model. Three keys to our ability to model the data described in the main paper are semi-Markov statespaces, the ability to perform action-selection within those state-spaces, and hyperbolic discounting. (S8, S20) , while the overall agent shows hyperbolic discounting, consistent with the experimental literature (S16, S18). Recent fMRI data suggest a gradient of discounting factors across the striatal ventromedial-dorsolateral axis, with faster discounting factors occuring in the ventromedial portion and slower discounting factors occuring in the dorsolateral portion (S31).
Model justifaction. The model described in this paper is an abstract model of temporal-difference But the model does not require this.
Agents. The agent itself consised of a constantly changing set of Agents, each of which was specified by a four-tuple s i t i f i γ i , which identified the Agent's believed-state s i , believed dwell-time within that state t i , the fitness of the Agent f i , and the Agent's internal discounting parameter γ i . A Agent thus represented a hypothesis about the current state of the world, but carried no history with it.
Thus the Agent was essentially Markov and the standard TDRL equations could be used. The fitness of the Agent 0 f i 1 was recalculated on each time-step, reflecting the likelihood of the Agent's hypothesis, given the observation (or lack of observation) received in the time-step, and given the time spent by Agent i in it's current state. At each time-step, Agents were selected for "survival" with a probability equal to their fitness f i . Rejected Agents were then replaced by a copy of a "surviving"
Agent selected at random from the remaining population, again with probabilty equal to fitness (so that fitter Agents were more likely to be chosen to replace rejected Agents). When "copying", only the s i and t i parameters of the Agent were replaced; γ i was not changed. The set of Agents thus provided an instantiation of the belief distribution of the agent across the multiple states of the process model.
Action-selection. Action-selection proceeded as a three-step process. First, the agent calculated the expected "benefit" 1 of each action. Then, the agent selected an action proportional to the benefit of each. Finally, the agent decided whether to take the action or not.
Overall benefit expected from action a was calculated as a weighted average of the expected benefits as calculated by the Agents. First, each Agent calculated the Benefit as:
where V´s i µ was the value of the state the Agent believed itself to be in, and V´S l µ the value of and E R´S l µ the expected reward of the state reached by taking action S i a S l . The overall expected benefit of each action was then defined as the average over all Agents:
Based on these benefits, actions were selected proportionally. Thus, the probability of selecting an action a was proportional to the benefit B´aµ:
Finally, once the agent selected action a, it decided whether to take action a using a soft-max mechanism:
This action-selection process captures the three keys to action-selection: the identification of useful actions, the selection of action based on the change in value expected upon taking the action, and a process that decides whether to act or not, presumably depenendent on the benefit of acting. Other action-selection mechanisms which capture these three key processes (such as that proposed by McClure et al. (S9) ) also produced qualitatively similar results to those shown in the main paper.
Overview This Agent model, although more complex than some TDRL models, is simple to implement, replicates the extant data on dopamine and cued-and uncued-reward (S13, full paper in preparation), allows us to model the important results of the addiction literature (main paper), and shows hyperbolic discounting. Hyperbolic discounting in this model arises because the agent includes multiple exponential discounting parameters (distributed across the Agents). Simulations were based on the 6-state world-model ( Figure S1) 5 . At the beginning of each simulation, the agent began in state S 0 . The agent remained in state S 0 until it took an action. On taking action a 1 , the world changed to state S 1 , where it remained for 3 time-steps, after which it provided a reward R´S 3 µ to the agent. On taking action a 2 , the world changed to state S 2 , where it remained for 3 time-steps, after which it provided drug R´S 4 µ D´S 4 µ to the agent. After 1 time-step in either state S 3 or S 4 (as appropriate) the world entered the ITI state. Actually, the world entered one of the 1000 possible ITI states, but the agent distributed it's belief across those states. After 20 time-steps, the world transitioned to state S 0 . This world-model simulates a standard two-lever choice paradigm in which an agent must push one lever to receive food reward and one lever to receive drug, each of which is delivered as appropriate after a short delay. The ITI state models the agents lack of knowledge about inter-trial intervals and provides for more realistic simulations in the Agent model (S13).
All non-reward related parameters were held constant. The simulations for elasticity were based on a 4-state world-model ( Figure S3 ). Simulations always started in the S 0 Action-available state. The world remained in that state unless the agent took action S 0 a 0 S 1 . On taking action a 0 , the agent was assesed a cost (R´S 1 µ 0 Simulations were run for 10 5 time-steps, and the total number of actions taken was measured. In order to determine the elasticity, the number of actions taken when faced with cost C was normalized to the total number of actions taken with no cost (C 0). See Figure 2 in the main paper. In order to measure developing inelasticity, the first 500 actions (and thus the first 500 rewards) were measured.
See Figure S4 .
As noted in the main paper, elasticity changes for drug-receipt, but not for natural rewards. This occurs because the values of states leading to natural rewards asymptote to a bound (approximating Equation 1 in the main paper), while states leading to drug-receipt increase without bound. The simulations for discounting were based on a 3-state world model, shown in Figure S5 . The world started in the ITI state, after a random delay, the world delivered a conditioning stimulus (CS), and entered state S 0 , where it remained for a set time (the delay, d timesteps, the independent variable in the discounting simulation). After that delay, a reward was delivered to the agent and the world Proportional value of a reward was measured as the value of state S 0 after the delivery of 300 rewards. Natural rewards were modeled as R´S 1 µ 1 0 D´S 1 µ 0 0 Figure S6 , below, shows that the Agents model showed hyperbolic discounting with natural rewards. The simulations of the dual dopaminergic signal used the same Pavlovian state space as the discounting simulations ( Figure S7 ). The inter-stimulus interval delay (state S 0 ) was set to a constant 5 steps. Natural rewards were modeled as R´S 1 µ 1 0 D´S 1 µ 0 0; drug-receipt was modeled as 
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